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arms and ammunition, i.e., we would supply arms only to the Central Government of China and their nominees. At the same time, in view of the fact that other embargo Powers were supplying aeroplanes to the Chinese in spite of our attempts to tighten up the embargo under this heading, we decided not to regard aeroplanes for commercial purposes as coming within the scope of the embargo. It is in view of this last decision that we have recently declined to intervene in order to prevent Messrs Vickers from carrying out an order for aeroplanes for Marshal Chang Tso-lin. The supply of arms and munitions to General Li is on quite a different footing. The question of including aeroplanes in the embargo was a point on which the embargo Powers were not agreed; but the supply of arms and munitions would be in flat contradiction to the Embargo Agreement, and we could scarcely be so cynical as to remain parties to the Agreement, while at the same time supplying General Li with arms. We would therefore have to withdraw from the Agreement. No doubt other Powers would follow our example, but upon us would rest the odium of breaking down an arrangement which, although partially ineffective, has certainly, to some extent, prevented a general scramble to supply the Chinese with arms, and has stood as a visible sign of the Powers' refusal to take sides in the Chinese civil war. This brings us to the wider question of neutrality. Marshal Chang Tso-lin has repeatedly approached His Majesty's Minister at Peking for British support in his anti-Bolshevik campaign. His latest appeal is attached hereto (A), together with the reply (B) which it is proposed to send to Sir M. Lampson. This reply reaffirms the policy of His Majesty's Government to refrain from any action which might be interpreted as interference in China's internal affairs, and to observe complete neutrality between all the contesting factions. If we refuse a loan for Chang Tso-lin to pursue his anti-" Red" activities, it is clear that we must also refuse to assist General Li with arms. If we supply the arms to General Li, Chang will at once accuse us of giving help to his enemies (for General Li is a Southerner) and refusing it to himself. It would be very difficult to defend our position in such a case, and Chang would be fully justified in accusing us of action unfriendly to him. Further reasons for refusing to supply arms to General Li will be found in the draft reply to the Colonial Office, which is attached hereto (C). They are as
follows:--
(1.) We can have no special confidence in General Li; in China military leaders rise and fall; their professions of friendship are quite unreliable.
(2.) There is no possible guarantee that the arms supplied will be used solely against the Communists at Canton. General Li's command is part of the Southern army; only a short time ago Sir M. Lampson was anxious as to the possibility of Southern troops arriving before Peking and Tien-tsin; so the arms might very well be used for an anti-Northern expedition. (3.) Or they might be used for an attack against British troops in the Shanghai
area.
The reasons in favour of the supply of arms have been put forward by the Governor of Hong Kong and are strongly supported by the Colonial Office. They rest on a belief that General Li is determined to maintain order and to suppress Communism, piracy and brigandage in Kwangtung Province; and that his proper use of them could be guaranteed by granting only small supplies of arms at intervals and by making each delivery contingent on our being satisfied that he was carrying out his undertakings. The Colonial Office contend that this would be merely supply of arms to the established authority in Canton for police purposes, and therefore outside the scope of the Embargo Agreement. Further, they do not consider it would be a breach of His Majesty's Government's policy of neutrality, since General Li is understood to have been in control of Canton for some months, and appears now to have succeeded in consolidating his position there. They point to the subsidising of the Governor of Yunnan by the French and to the material assistance "lent by the Japanese to Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria as precedents for such action. But, for the reasons stated above, the Foreign Office cannot accept so wide an interpretation either of their arms embargo obligations or of their neutrality policy.
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A further suggestion is made by the Acting Consul-General at Canton (and approved by the Government of Hong Kong) that if we ourselves cannot supply arms, we should allow such arms to be supplied through a German firm, and give the Cantonese an assurance that the consignment would not be seized en route under
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the arms regulations of our Colonial Governments. Further, that he should authorise a British insurance company to cover the risk. This suggestion is approved by His Majesty's Admiralty, but strongly opposed by the Colonial Office, who advocate instead the secret supply of arms to the Canton Government by His Majesty's Government themselves. To the Foreign Office Mr. Brenan's proposal seems to be a half-measure with all the disadvantages that half-measures generally have. It would be no less un-neutral than a direct supply of arms, especially as we have held up and confiscated at Singapore recently a shipment of arms for the Northern leaders. Further, the Germans themselves are beginning to realise that the profits of the China arms trade are hardly worth the invidious position into which they have been getting themselves; and on the 9th May the German consul at Hong Kong handed to the Colonial Secretary the following translation of a communication issued by the German Legation at Peking on the 18th April:-
<
'Association of German shipowners and German East Asiatic Society at Hamburg have decided not to undertake or execute any shipment of arms and ammunition of war which are destined to be used in China from German ports or on German ships."
The Foreign Office therefore hold to their long-established policy of carrying out to the fullest extent their obligations under the Arms Embargo and of maintaining strict neutrality in China; they suggest that instructions should be issued as in the attached telegrams to Sir M. Lampson at Peking and to Mr. Brenan at Canton; that the enclosed letter on the subject should be addressed to the Colonial Office; and that the Portuguese Embassy should be informed of their views.
Foreign Office, May 16, 1927.
(A.)
more
Sir M. Lampson to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 6.) (No. 825.) (Telegraphic.)
Peking, May 5, 1927. CHANG TSO-LIN called 4th May, and after enquiring what decisions had been reached by the Powers concerning action on Yang-tsže, developed at length, with usual arguments, reasons why His Majesty's Government should assist him in combating Bolshevism in China. He referred to further proof we had recently had, from raid on Russian propaganda headquarters here, of Bolshevik designs to destroy British interests in China. He discounted genuineness of so-called moderate movement of Chiang, which he described as [? omitted: prompted by] purely personal motives. We had already, to all intents and purposes, intervened with troops and ships without accomplishing much beyond incurring odium, and we should find it very much
effective and cheaper to secure our objects by supporting him. In any case, it was not a question of intervening in Chinese affairs, but of taking steps to combat world menace of Bolshevism, which, if allowed to take root in China, would spread all over Asia, including India. His troops had now reached the neighbourhood of Sinyang in Southern Honan, but he was now halting their further advance into Hupei until he had ascertained intentions of the Powers towards Bolshevik menace, which he was not prepared to deal with single-handed on the Yang-tsze. He threw out usual hints of his having even to abandon Peking and to withdraw to Manchuria if the Powers would not afford him the necessary support. Referring to Japanese and their double policy of supporting him in the North and Chiang in the South, he said they were still in close touch with Chiang, hoped to replace Russians in the latter's employment by Japanese, and to benefit by destruction of British commercial interests.
I explained to him our policy of non-intervention, but promised, at his urgent request, to transmit his message to you.
(Repeated to Tokyo, Shanghai, Mr. Newton, Hong Kong, Canton and Commander-in-chief.)
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